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Abstract
Compassion shown towards victims often decreases as the number of individuals in need of aid increases, identifi-
ability of the victims decreases, and the proportion of victims helped shrinks. Such “compassion fade” may hamper
individual-level and collective responses to pressing large-scale crises. To date, research on compassion fade has fo-
cused on humanitarian challenges; thus, it remains unknown whether and to what extent compassion fade emerges when
victims are non-human others. Here we show that compassion fade occurs in the environmental domain, but only among
non-environmentalists. These findings suggest that compassion fade may challenge our collective ability and willingness
to confront the major environmental problems we face, including climate change. The observed moderation effect of
environmental identity further indicates that compassion fade may present a significant psychological barrier to building
broad public support for addressing these problems. Our results highlight the importance of bringing findings from the
field of judgment and decision making to bear on pressing societal issues.
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1 Introduction
A single child fallen down a well or dying of starvation
stirs our hearts and moves our hands (and wallets) to ac-
tion (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997). Yet as soon as the
number of victims increases to two, compassion—both
affective and behavioral—begins to wane (Vastfjall, Pe-
ters & Slovic, 2012). Such compassion fade (i.e., de-
creases in helping behavior or support for it) has been
widely documented in the humanitarian domain (Slovic,
2007) and is troubling for at least three reasons. First, it
defies our normative beliefs about how we should value
the lives of those in need (MacLean, 1986). Second, it
contradicts our intuitions about how we ourselves would
react when asked to aid others (Dunn & Ashton-James,
2008). Third, it suggests that confronting large-scale
humanitarian and (perhaps) environmental crises—from
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mass starvation to climate change—may not only involve
overcoming political and economic hurdles but also in-
sidious psychological ones as well (Gifford, 2011).
Nearly all extant research on compassion fade has fo-
cused on humanitarian causes (e.g., starving children; see
for example Cameron & Payne, 2011; Small, Loewen-
stein & Slovic, 2007). As a result, it is not yet known
whether, to what extent, and among which individuals
compassion fade emerges when victims are non-human
animals. However, because the environmental challenges
we face involve millions of unidentified victims, there is
a distinct possibility that compassion fade occurs in this
domain, hampering policymakers’ and environmental ad-
vocates’ efforts to allocate sufficient resources to protect
non-human animal species. Here, we extend research on
compassion fade into this previously unstudied domain.
We also contribute to the broader psychological literature
on compassion fade by examining a novel moderator vari-
able, i.e., personal commitment to a cause.
1.1 Compassion fade and the provision of
aid
Past research has found that decision-makers are often in-
sensitive to the scope of humanitarian and environmental
crises (Kahneman & Knetsch, 1992), providing similar
levels of aid regardless of the number of victims in need.
For example, Devousges et al. (1993) demonstrated that
willingness to pay to protect migrating birds from pre-
ventable, human-caused deaths varied little whether the
number of birds affected was 2,000 or 200,000. These
and other findings suggest that compassion towards oth-
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ers (e.g., providing financial or other aid) quickly reaches
a horizontal asymptote as the number of victims in-
creases. However, as noted above, findings from a num-
ber of distinct yet related lines of inquiry suggest that
in some cases compassion does not merely flatten, but
actually decreases—fades—as the number of victims in-
creases.
Three overlapping yet distinct sets of findings speak
to the existence of compassion fade. First, when asked
to provide aid, individuals are highly sensitive to the
proportion of victims that can be helped: As the total
population of those in need (including victims who can-
not be helped) increases, people show less willingness
to help the same absolute number of victims (Bartels,
2006; Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson & Friedrich,
1997; Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997). Such “proportion
dominance effects” are non-normative (Baron, 1997), as
knowledge about those who cannot be helped should not
de-motivate provision of aid to those who can be aided
(Slovic, 2007). Second, numerous studies have demon-
strated that (many) individuals respond more compas-
sionately to requests for aid that describe a single, iden-
tified victim (e.g., a starving child) than they do to re-
quests that statistically describe the scope of a humanitar-
ian crisis (e.g., Friedrich & McGuire, 2010; Small et al.,
2007) or to requests that combine both types of appeals;
this finding is often referred to as the “identifiable vic-
tim effect”. Third, greater compassion is shown towards
a single, identified victim than towards two (Västfjäll et
al., 2012), three (Schmidt & Wilson, 2011) or eight vic-
tims (e.g., Kogut & Ritov, 2005); these findings are of-
ten labeled as either “identifiable victim” or “singular-
ity” effects. Although it is possible (and indeed likely)
that a number of distinct underlying mechanisms are re-
sponsible for driving these effects (see next section), past
and recent findings suggest that they are closely related
to one another (e.g., Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997 found
that proportion dominance was in fact one key driver of
observed identifiable victim effects). Thus, compassion
fade is a robust (and diverse) phenomenon that emerges
under numerous eliciting conditions.
1.2 Explaining compassion fade
Numerous affective, cognitive and motivational mech-
anisms have been proposed to account for compassion
fade. For example, decision-makers may show greater
compassion towards a single victim in part because a sin-
gle individual elicits an inherently stronger affective re-
sponse than does a group (Kogut & Ritov, 2005; Slovic,
2007). Smith, Faro and Burson (2013) suggest this may
be the case in part because groups of individuals are per-
ceived as less cohesive (i.e., they lack entitativity). Com-
passion fade may also occur in part because, although
humans are well-practiced at taking another person’s per-
spective (which generally increases altruistic behavior),
taking the perspective of a group is relatively difficult
(Batson et al., 1997). In a different vein, overreliance
on proportional reasoning may lead to perceptions of
inefficacy as the reference group to which victims be-
long increases in size (so-called “drop-in-the-bucket” ef-
fects; Baron, 1997). And from a motivational perspec-
tive, Cameron and Payne (2011) have argued that indi-
viduals preemptively down-regulate their emotional re-
sponse in helping situations when they know they will be
asked to aid multiple individuals (in order to avoid being
overwhelmed by the scope of the aid request). These var-
ious accounts are not mutually exclusive, and each likely
plays a role in shaping individuals’ compassionate behav-
ior.
Critically, although much of the past research on com-
passion fade has treated the phenomenon as a “main
effect” (Friedrich & McGuire, 2010), recent work has
demonstrated that some individuals are more susceptible
than others. For example, Cameron and Payne (2011)
showed that sympathy for one victim was greater than for
eight victims only among subjects who were relatively
skilled at emotion-regulation. Friedrich and McGuire
(2010) found that compassion fade emerged only among
individuals who scored relatively low on a measure of
rational (as opposed to experiential) processing style
(Pacini & Epstein, 1999; see also Friedrich et al., 1999
for related findings). Fetherstonhaugh et al. (1997) re-
ported that people who place higher value on saving lives
in general did not show proportion dominance effects.
And Smith et al. (2013) have suggested that compassion
fade is more likely to occur among individuals who per-
ceive groups of victims as lacking entitativity.
1.3 Compassion fade in the environmental
domain
Whether or not compassion fade will emerge when the
individuals in need of aid are non-human animals is
presently unknown. On the one hand, both the contingent
valuation findings discussed above as well as anecdotal
evidence suggest that the effect may occur in the environ-
mental domain (e.g., Song, 2002). Moreover, Smith et
al.’s (2013) entitativity studies, which included animals
as targets of aid, provide indirect evidence that processes
related to compassion fade in the humanitarian domain
may translate to the environmental context.
Other findings, however, raise doubts. For example,
Hart (2011) found that information about the negative
effects of climate change on all polar bears produced
stronger support for ameliorative environmental policies
than did information about negative effects on a single
bear; however, this study did not examine individuals’
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willingness to help the polar bear(s) specifically. Hsee
and Rottenstreich (2004) found that donations to help one
versus four pandas were not significantly different when
photos of the animals were shown to subjects; however,
the use of the same photo copied four times to represent
multiple pandas may simply have failed to make salient
the existence of multiple individuals. And Kogut and Ri-
tov (2007) found that compassion fade occurred (with hu-
man victims) only when decision-makers learned about
in-group members in need of aid (i.e., greater helping
for a single in-group victim than for multiple in-group
victims); helping behavior directed at out-group mem-
bers was similar regardless of how many victims were
presented. However, in a more recent set of studies,
Ritov and Kogut (2011) demonstrated identifiable vic-
tim effects only when helping out-group members (i.e.,
more aid provided to an identified victim than to a non-
identified victim) and reverse effects with in-group mem-
bers (i.e., less aid provided to an identified versus non-
identified victim); these (potentially) conflicting findings
and their implications for the present research are dis-
cussed further below. Regardless of the direction of the
group membership effect, both sets of studies by Kogut
and Ritov appear to suggest that the emergence and de-
gree of environmental compassion fade may differ across
individuals as a function of whether non-human animals
are viewed as in-group versus out-group members.
Given these conflicting findings as well as the modera-
tion effects discussed above, it is unclear whether com-
passion fade will emerge in the environmental domain
and, if so, whether individual differences factors might
moderate the effect. For example, Kogut and Ritov’s ear-
lier (2007) findings appear to suggest that, when victims
are animals, individuals who are not highly concerned
about environmental issues (i.e., non-environmentalists)
may demonstrate relatively weak compassion fade effects
(because animals are likely to be perceived as out-group
members).
However, our primary prediction was that the oppo-
site pattern of results would obtain in the environmental
domain: greater levels of compassion fade among non-
environmentalists than among environmentalists. Con-
sideration of a number of distinct yet complimentary
mechanisms leads us to this hypothesis. First, com-
passion fade appears to be affected by an individual’s
prior knowledge about and/or commitment to an issue
or targeted outcome (e.g., environmental protection, hu-
manitarian aid): individuals who highly value an out-
come (e.g., saving lives) appear to be less susceptible
to compassion fade (e.g., Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997).
Thus, we expect environmentalists—who are more aware
of, educated about and concerned with environmental
issues (Clayton, 2003)—to demonstrate relatively little
or perhaps no compassion fade. For such individuals,
hearing about animals in need—be it a single victim
or thousands—may simply serve as a reminder of the
widespread problem that exists, a problem they have
previously thought about and are already committed to
confronting. In contrast, non-environmentalists lack a
broader framework for interpreting information about a
specific aid request and are likely to be relatively less in-
terested in the problem at hand. As a result, these indi-
viduals may rely more heavily on affective and cognitive
heuristics—which have previously been shown to pro-
duce compassion fade (e.g., Friedrich & Dood, 2009)—
when deciding whether and how much aid to provide,
leading to greater compassion fade.
An alternative yet compatible explanation draws on
Ritov and Kogut’s (2011) recent finding that, in the
context of inter-group conflict, helping behavior is en-
hanced when considering identified (vs. non-identified)
out-group members and reduced when considering iden-
tified in-group members. As suggested above, to the ex-
tent that individuals view non-human animals and hu-
mans as being in conflict (which seems plausible)—
and that non-environmentalists tend to treat animals as
out-group members and environmentalists view them
as in-group members—Ritov and Kogut’s (2011) find-
ings similarly support our prediction that compassion
fade will emerge only (or more strongly) among non-
environmentalists (although it is important to note that
Ritov and Kogut’s recent studies specifically examined
the interaction between group dynamics and identifiabil-
ity, not the interaction between group membership and
the number of victims in need of aid, as we explore in the
present work). We directly tested these hypotheses in a
series of three studies.
2 Study 1
Past research has established that individuals are sensitive
to the relative proportion of victims that can be helped:
as the ratio of those helped to those who are “unreach-
able” decreases, individuals’ willingness to provide aid
decreases (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997). This is the case
even when the actual number of victims being helped
does not change. As indicated above, this “proportion
dominance effect” has been hypothesized and shown to
be an important contributor to compassion fade. In Study
1, we thus examined whether this important mechanism
occurs when the victims are non-human animals.
2.1 Methods
2.1.1 Subjects
Subjects were 181 undergraduate students (128 females;
mean age = 20.38 years, SD = 4.20; 76%Caucasian) from
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a public university in the northwestern U.S. who partic-
ipated in return for course credit. Fifty-seven (31.5%)
self-identified as environmentalists (as described shortly).
2.1.2 Procedure and measures
Subjects completed all measures as part of an omnibus
study conducted online; exposure to the experimental ma-
nipulation (manipulated between subjects) and dependent
measures occurred at the beginning of the study. Subjects
in both conditions were told that a recent hurricane had
destroyed breeding platforms used by an at-risk popula-
tion of wood storks. Subjects were then told that local
groups were raising funds to reconstruct 450 platforms to
help the birds; they were also told that those local groups
were seeking volunteers to help build the platforms. In
the “large proportion helped” condition (N = 92), the to-
tal population was said to consist of 1,100 wood storks;
in the “small proportion helped” condition (N= 89), the
population consisted of 25,000 storks.
After reading the information, subjects were asked two
questions which served as our dependent variables. First,
we asked, “Assuming the volunteering were to take place
during the summer when you didn’t have any classes,
how likely would you be to travel to the affected area and
volunteer to build and install the breeding platforms?”
Subjects responded using a 5-point scale (1 = not at all
likely, 5 = extremely likely). Second, we measured dona-
tion intention by asking, “How much would you consider
donating to help this cause?” Subjects responded using a
6-point scale divided into $10 increments ($0 to $50). Af-
ter completing a number of unrelated measures, subjects’
environmental identity was measured with a single yes/no
item: “I consider myself to be an environmentalist.” (This
simple yet robust measure of environmentalism was used
in all three studies reported in this paper).
2.2 Results and discussion
Subjects’ responses to the volunteering and donation
items served as the dependent variables. Responses
to the volunteering item were entered into a 2 (large
vs. small proportion) x 2 (environmentalist vs. non-
environmentalist) between-subjects analysis of variance,
which yielded a significant main-effect of environmen-
talism, F(1, 176) = 5.05, p = .03, reffect = .17, and the
predicted interaction between environmentalism and con-
dition, F(1, 176) = 4.38, p = .04, reffect = .16; there
was no significant main effect of condition, F(1, 176)
= 1.19, p = .28, reffect =  .08. Planned simple ef-
fects analyses revealed an effect of condition among non-
environmentalists, F(1, 122) = 8.07, p = .01, reffect = .25,
but not among environmentalists, F(1, 54) = .36, p = .55,
reffect = .08. As shown in Figure 1, non-environmentalists
Figure 1: Shows results from Study 1, likelihood of vol-
unteering: non-environmentalists were significantly less
willing to volunteer to help the same number of wood
storks (450) when the total proportion of animals helped
was small rather than large. Environmentalists’ willing-
ness to volunteer was similar in the two conditions. Error
bars show ± 1 standard error.
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were more willing to volunteer in the “large proportion”
condition (M = 2.12, SD = 1.02) than in the “small pro-
portion” condition (M = 1.64, SD = .85); in contrast, en-
vironmentalists were equally willing to volunteer in the
“large proportion” (M = 2.15, SD = .91) and “small pro-
portion” conditions (M = 2.30, SD = .99).
Responses to the donation item were similarly ana-
lyzed. Across the entire sample, there was no signifi-
cant main effect of condition on hypothetical donation
behavior, F(1, 176) = 2.26, p = .14, reffect =  .08. A
main-effect of environmentalism emerged, F(1, 176) =
11.30, p = .001, reffect = .25, as did a non-significant in-
teraction between condition and environmentalism, F(1,
176) = 2.28, p = .13, reffect = .11. As shown in Figure 2,
the pattern of results closely mirrored those of the vol-
unteering item: planned simple effects analyses revealed
that non-environmentalists in the “large proportion” con-
dition reported larger hypothetical donations (M = 14.46,
SD = 14.58) than did those in the “small proportion” con-
dition (M = 9.49, SD = 8.60), F(1, 122) = 5.21, p = .02,
reffect = .20, supporting the compassion fade hypothesis.
In contrast, environmentalists donated similar amounts
in the “large proportion” (M = 18.08, SD = 11.32) and
“small proportion” conditions (M = 19.00, SD = 12.69),
F(1, 54) = .08, p = .78, reffect = .04.
Thus, Study 1 provided initial evidence that compas-
sion fade (in the form of proportion dominance) emerges
in the environmental domain, but only among individu-
als who are relatively less interested in and engaged with
environmental issues (i.e., non-environmentalists); more-
over, Study 1 demonstrated that these effects emerge in
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Figure 2: Shows results from Study 1, donation inten-
tion: non-environmentalists donated significantly less to
help the same number of wood storks (450) when the to-
tal proportion of animals helped was small rather than
large. Environmentalists donated similar amounts in the
two conditions. Error bars show ± 1 standard error.
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the context of donating both time and money. These find-
ings suggest that, for individuals who are relatively less
practiced and interested in thinking about the scope of en-
vironmental issues (and/or who perhaps view animals as
out-group members in conflict with humans), secondary
features of the helping situation may play an outsized role
in driving compassionate decision-making. We attempted
to replicate and extend these findings in a second study
using a different paradigm.
3 Study 2
In Study 2, subjects were either told about the plight of a
single, identified animal or else given information about
the challenges facing an entire population of threatened
animals. Past research has demonstrated that information
about a single, identified (human) individual generates
greater levels of affective and behavioral compassion than
does statistical information about a group (e.g., Small et
al., 2007); however, the possible moderating role of com-
mitment to environmentalism has not been examined in
this context.
3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Subjects
The sample consisted of 212 undergraduate students (149
females; mean age = 19.72 years, SD = 2.88; 82% Cau-
casian) from a U.S. public university who participated
in return for course credit. Seventy-six (35.8%) self-
identified as environmentalists.
Figure 3: Shows results from Study 2, likelihood of dona-
tion: non-environmentalists were significantly less likely
to donate to help all remaining polar bears than to help a
single polar bear. Environmentalists’ likelihood of dona-
tion was similar in the two conditions. Error bars show ±
1 standard error.
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3.1.2 Procedure and methods
As in Study 1, the manipulation and dependent vari-
ables were the first measures presented as part of a larger
omnibus survey conducted online. In both conditions
(between-subjects design), subjects were told to imagine
that after unexpectedly finding $10, an individual work-
ing with the group “Save the Polar Bears” handed them a
letter asking if they would consider donating to help pro-
tect the bears. In the “population” condition (N = 101),
subjects were shown a montage of polar bear pictures and
given some facts about the challenges currently facing the
world’s polar bear populations (e.g., the lack of food and
habitat); in the “identified” condition (N = 111), subjects
saw a picture of a single adult bear and were given similar
information as in the “population” condition, except that
the information was about the single bear (who was given
a name).
After reading the donation request letter, subjects were
asked two questions that served as the dependent vari-
ables of interest. First, we asked, “How likely would you
be to donate to this cause?” Subjects responded using a 5-
point scale (1 = not at all likely, 5 = extremely likely). Sec-
ond, we measured donation intention by asking, “How
much of your recently discovered $10 would you con-
sider donating?” Subjects responded using an 11-point
scale ($0-10). As in Study 1, subjects indicated their en-
vironmental identity at a later point (using the same mea-
sure described above).
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Figure 4: Shows results from Study 2, donation intention:
non-environmentalists donated significantly less to help
all remaining polar bears than they did to help a single
polar bear. Environmentalists donated similar amounts in
the two conditions. Error bars show ± 1 standard error.
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3.2 Results and discussion
As shown in Figures 3 and 4, the pattern of results for
both measures of donation intention was nearly iden-
tical to the one that emerged in Study 1. Responses
to the likelihood of donation item were entered into a
2 (identified vs. population) x 2 (environmentalist vs.
non-environmentalist) between-subjects analysis of vari-
ance, which yielded a significant main-effect of envi-
ronmentalism, F(1, 207) = 7.62, p = .01, reffect = .19,
and the predicted interaction between environmentalism
and condition, F(1, 207) = 5.56, p = .02, reffect = .16;
there was no significant main effect of condition, F(1,
207) = .38, p = .54, reffect =  .04. Planned simple ef-
fects analyses revealed an effect of condition among non-
environmentalists, F(1, 133) = 7.01, p = .01, reffect = .22,
but not among environmentalists, F(1, 74) = .98, p = .33,
reffect = .11. As shown in Figure 3, non-environmentalists
reported stronger intentions to donate in the “identified”
condition (M = 3.30, SD = .99) than in the “population”
condition (M = 2.86, SD = .97); in contrast, environmen-
talists reported equally strong intentions to donate in the
“identified” (M = 3.36, SD = 1.12) and “population” con-
ditions (M = 3.63, SD = 1.16).
Similar results emerged for the donation amount item.
A 2 (identified vs. population) x 2 (environmentalist vs.
non-environmentalist) between-subjects analysis of vari-
ance revealed a significant main-effect of environmen-
talism, F(1, 208) = 7.58, p = .01, reffect = .19, and a
marginally significant interaction between environmen-
talism and condition, F(1, 208) = 3.07, p = .08, reffect
= .12; there was no significant main-effect of condi-
tion, F(1, 208) = 1.65, p = .20, reffect =  .09. Re-
sults of planned simple effects tests showed that non-
environmentalists donated more to help a single polar
bear (M = 6.21, SD = 3.66) than they did to help all of the
polar bears (M = 4.64, SD = 3.55), F(1, 134) = 6.47, p =
.01, reffect =  .22. In contrast, the amounts environmen-
talists said they would donate were similar in the “identi-
fied” (M = 6.73, SD = 3.82) and “population” conditions
(M = 6.97, SD = 3.15), F(1, 74) = .09, p = .77, reffect =
.03.
Results of Study 2 conceptually replicated and ex-
tended findings from Study 1. Thus, the study pro-
vided further evidence that compassion fade emerges
in the environmental domain, but only among non-
environmentalists (again supporting our primary hy-
potheses). However, the conclusions that we can draw
from these first two studies are tempered by the fact that
the measures of compassionate decision-making used
were hypothetical and involved intentions to act rather
than actual action. We rectified this shortcoming in Study
3.
4 Study 3
In Study 3, we held both the proportion of animals helped
and the identifiability of the victims constant across con-
ditions and examined how quickly the drop-off in com-
passion occurs as the number of animals in need of aid
increases (i.e., singularity effect). Based on past find-
ings (e.g., Kogut & Ritov, 2005) and the results of Stud-
ies 1 and 2, we predicted that helping behavior among
non-environmentalists would begin to decrease as soon
as there are two animals in need and continue to decrease
as the number of animals increases.
4.1 Methods
4.1.1 Subjects
We recruited 171 undergraduate students (110 females;
74% Caucasian) seated in public areas on the campus of
a public northwestern U.S. university. Individuals par-
ticipated in return for $5. Eighty-seven (50.9%) self-
identified as environmentalists.
4.1.2 Procedure and methods
Subjects were approached in various public spaces on
a university campus. After determining their eligibil-
ity, subjects completed a brief, unrelated decision-making
task in exchange for $5. Subjects were then paid in
single-dollar bills and told that the research team was col-
lecting donations to support panda conservation on behalf
of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). Subjects were then
given one of three donation request letters and a blank
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Figure 5: Shows results from Study 3: As the number of
pandas in need of aid increased, non-environmentalists
provided significantly smaller donations to a charitable
group working on their behalf. Environmentalists’ do-
nations did not differ significantly as a function of the
number of animals in need. Error bars show ± 1 standard
error.
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envelope in which they were instructed to place any do-
nations. After handing the request letter and envelope to
the subject, the experimenter walked approximately 15-
20 feet away in order to minimize possible social desir-
ability effects.
Request letters provided information about a single
panda, two pandas, or eight pandas; all pandas were
named and given ages, and photos were provided. The
total monetary need was kept constant across the three
between-subjects conditions (all Ns = 57). After subjects
made their donation decision, they signaled the experi-
menter to return and handed him or her the sealed en-
velope; the amount found in the envelope ($0-5) served
as the dependent variable. Finally, subjects filled out a
very brief post-decision questionnaire, during which they
indicated whether or not they identified as an environ-
mentalist (using the same measure described above). All
donations made by subjects were in fact passed along to
WWF.
4.2 Results and discussion
On average, subjects donated $2.87 to help the pandas;
this average included the 16% of the sample who donated
nothing. We conducted a 3 (one vs. two vs. eight pandas)
x 2 (environmentalist vs. non-environmentalist) between-
subjects analysis of variance, and explicitly tested the
hypothesis that donations would decrease as the num-
ber of pandas in need of aid increased. There were no
main-effects of environmentalism or condition, both Fs <
1. However, our analysis revealed a statistically signifi-
cant interaction between environmentalism and the linear
trend in the condition variable, F(1, 165) = 4.93, p = .03,
reffect = .17, as predicted. As shown in Figure 5, differ-
ences again emerged between non-environmentalists and
environmentalists. Among non-environmentalists, sub-
jects donated more to help one panda (M = 3.50, SD =
1.84) than they did to help two (M = 2.83, SD = 2.07),
or eight (M = 2.25, SD = 2.08). Planned contrasts re-
vealed a significant linear effect of condition among non-
environmentalists, F(1, 82) = 5.29, p = .02, reffect =  .25;
there was no quadratic effect present, F(1, 82) = .01, p
= .93, reffect = .01. In contrast, donations to one (M =
2.50, SD = 2.01), two (M = 3.30, SD = 1.94), or eight
(M = 2.93, SD = 2.12) pandas did not significantly differ
among environmentalists. No significant linear, F(1, 85)
= .68, p = .41, reffect = .09, or quadratic, F(1, 85) = 1.53,
p = .22, reffect = .13, effects emerged.
Thus, Study 3 again replicated and extended the find-
ings from Studies 1 and 2, demonstrating that com-
passion fade (here in the form of a singularity effect)
emerges in the environmental domain only among non-
environmentalists even when real monetary costs are at
stake. Moreover, Study 3 provided a strong test of the
environmental compassion fade hypothesis by demon-
strating a drop-off in compassionate behavior as soon as
the number of animals in need of aid increased beyond
one. In addition, by keeping the number of victims small,
maintaining the proportion of animals being helped con-
stant (i.e., 100% of those mentioned), and identifying vic-
tims in all conditions, Study 3 also helped rule out alter-
native, “rational” explanations of the observed decreases
in compassion across the three studies (e.g., “drop-in-the-
bucket” effects).
5 General discussion
Across three studies and five analyses (out of six), we
found consistent empirical evidence of environmental
compassion fade—compassion shown towards animals
in need of aid decreased as the number of victims in-
creased, identifiability of the victims decreased and the
proportion of animals helped shrank. As predicted, how-
ever, the effect emerged only among self-identified non-
environmentalists, people for whom environmental is-
sues are relatively low in salience and personal reso-
nance (Clayton, 2003); moreover, the magnitude of the
effect among these individuals was remarkably consis-
tent across the diverse set of experimental paradigms and
dependent variables (all r’s between .20 and .25). In con-
trast, individuals who reported a previously held, person-
ally significant commitment to environmental protection
displayed similar levels of compassion regardless of the
proportion (Study 1), identifiability (Study 2), or number
(Study 3) of animals in need of aid.
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The observed moderation effect of environmentalism
is critically important and requires further consideration,
in part because it suggests that previous accounts of com-
passion fade are incomplete and in need of further de-
velopment. Previously proposed mechanisms and mod-
erating factors—including motivated emotion regulation
(Cameron & Payne, 2011), entitativity (Smith et al.,
2013), and singularity effects (Kogut & Ritov, 2005)—do
not predict that individual differences in commitment to a
cause or personal identity should affect the emergence of
compassion fade when helping victims is congruent with
one’s preexisting commitments. However, as mentioned
in the Introduction, previous findings may help explain
the observed effect.
One possibility is that environmentalists’ and non-
environmentalists’ differing levels of identification with
the animals influenced their affective responses to the vic-
tims’ plight (which in turn affected donation behavior).
Such an account appears to be supported by Kogut and
Ritov’s previous work on group membership, identifiabi-
ity and singularity effects (2007, 2011), which has re-
vealed the interesting and often unintuitive ways in which
victims’ in-group versus out-group status influences peo-
ple’s willingness to help under various situations. For
example, Ritov and Kogut’s (2011) finding of increased
helping towards an identified (vs. non-identified) out-
group member and reduced helping towards an identified
(vs. non-identified) in-group member in the context of
inter-group conflict (e.g., competing sports teams) may
help explain the present findings. Our subjects (espe-
cially non-environmentalists) may have tended to view
humans and non-human animals as being in conflict with
one another (and animals as being out-group members).
Given dominant (American) cultural framings regarding
the zero-sum nature of natural resource consumption,
such perceived “inter-group conflict” seems quite plau-
sible (as does the possibility that non-environmentalists
in particular tend to view animals as out-group members).
At the very least, Ritov and Kogut’s findings (2011, 2007)
point to the importance of further considering whether
people differ in their perceptions of animals as in- or out-
group members.
An alternative and, we believe, compatible explanation
of our observed moderation effect is that while compas-
sion fade effects may be the norm in low involvement set-
tings (e.g., because individuals are reliant on heuristics,
see Friedrich & Dood, 2009), people are relatively less
likely to demonstrate such effects when they care deeply
about the individuals, groups or outcomes that are at stake
(thus explaining the lack of an effect among environmen-
talists when helping is directed at animals). In fact, a
number of previous studies lend support to this “valuing”
or “caring” conclusion. For example, Fetherstonhaugh
et al. (1997) found that people who place higher value
on saving lives in general did not show proportion domi-
nance in the context of providing humanitarian aid. Sim-
ilarly, Friedrich et al. (1999) found that the people who
placed the greatest value on saving lives were least likely
to require more lives to be saved to justify increased costs
(in the context of anti-lock brake regulations); consistent
effects were also found by Friedrich and Dood (2009) in
a study of willingness to tolerate war casualties.
Taking the pattern of moderation effects previously
demonstrated by Fetherstonhaugh et al. and Friedrich et
al. together with both Ritov and Kogut’s (2011) recent
in-group/out-group result and our own findings, it seems
plausible that it is specifically the value (or lack thereof)
placed on the domain under consideration by the potential
helper (e.g., environmental conservation; humanitarian
aid) that moderates the emergence of compassion fade.
Although this account still does not delineate the role that
relatively “hotter” and “colder” (i.e., affective vs. cog-
nitive) processes play in driving compassion fade (nor
does it specify the specific psychological mechanisms
involved in carrying the effects of “valuing,” e.g., dif-
ferences in identity, knowledge or self-efficacy), it does
seem to narrow the range of possibilities and thus help
direct future research in this domain.
5.1 Broader implications
Given the scale of the environmental crises we currently
face (NRC, 2010), the emergence of compassion fade
in the environmental context poses a challenge to pol-
icymakers, environmental advocates and others work-
ing to protect wildlife. Although we are encouraged
by environmentalists’ apparent resistance to the poten-
tially de-motivating nature of environmental tragedies
(Gifford, 2011), non-environmentalists’ susceptibility is
worrisome. Effectively responding to the environmental
challenges we face will require engaging a broad base
of public support, one that extends beyond the core en-
vironmental or “green” community (McKibben, 2010);
because compassion fade works to de-motivate the very
individuals and groups that remain un-engaged, it likely
makes the task of building such coalitions that much more
difficult.
The environmental problems we face involve large
numbers of victims and this fact should not be hidden or
downplayed by communicators. However, various strate-
gies might be used to help individuals connect more ef-
fectively with these victims. For example, recent re-
search suggests that compassion fade may be dampened
by increasing individuals’ perceptions that multiple indi-
viduals belong to a single, cohesive group (see Kahne-
man & Ritov, 1994; Smith et al., 2013). Other possible
strategies include using narrative to prime environmental-
ist sentiments and individuate victims (Slovic & Slovic,
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2004/2005), encouraging individuals to make initial low-
cost commitments to environmental protection, and im-
plementing interventions that increase direct contact with
nature (Nisbet, Zelenski & Murphy, 2011).
5.2 Limitations
The present research has a number of limitations that
should be addressed by future research. First, as dis-
cussed above, the present series of studies does not
clearly help us distinguish between competing accounts
of the compassion fade phenomenon (e.g., cognitive vs.
affective mechanisms), although the failure of these pro-
posed mechanisms to account for the present findings
suggests that none yet provide sufficiently developed
models of compassion fade. Second, we do not know
whether our subjects considered the animals presented
in each study to be in-group versus out-group members,
a factor previously found to moderate helping behav-
ior (e.g., Kogut & Ritov, 2007); future research should
measure perceptions of group membership and explic-
itly test the effects of such perceptions on helping be-
havior. Third, in all three studies we measured environ-
mentalism after subjects made their donation decisions;
this was done in order to avoid possible (and plausible)
contamination effects, but also leaves open the possibil-
ity that individuals’ self-identification as environmental-
ist or not was itself affected by the experimental manipu-
lations. Future research should rule out this possibility by
measuring environmental identity prior to providing sub-
jects with the opportunity to donate to an environmental
cause (ideally in a pre-testing session). Self-identification
should also be supplemented with measures designed to
quantify the affective, cognitive, and experiential aspects
of an individual’s connection to nature (e.g., Nisbet, Ze-
lenski & Murphy, 2009), along with questions designed
to assess behavioral indicators such as membership in en-
vironmental organizations or activism on behalf of envi-
ronmental causes.
Finally, despite making some progress towards expli-
cating the observed moderation effect of environmental
identity, further research is clearly warranted. The group-
and value-based mechanisms explored above represent
just two of numerous possible explanations for the ob-
served effect. For example, it may be that the moderation
effect was driven primarily by environmentalists’ greater
knowledge of the challenges facing wildlife (i.e., exper-
tise) or else by differences in the relationship between
perceived self-efficacy and pro-social behavior (which is
generally positive) as a function of how much one val-
ues the public good being provided or protected (which
would of course fit nicely with the broader “valuing”
mechanism proposed above); thus, environmentalists and
non-environmentalists alike may have felt less efficacious
as the number of victims increased, yet these feelings
of inefficacy may have been demotivating only for peo-
ple who did not strongly value the protection of wildlife
(i.e., non-environmentalists). Future studies that explic-
itly measure and/or manipulate affective states (includ-
ing valuing of outcomes), (environmental) identification
and commitment, depth-of-processing, efficacy and other
identified factors may go a long way towards clarifying
the drivers of compassion fade more generally.
5.3 Conclusion
Compassion fade poses a significant challenge to our
personal and collective capacity to respond effectively
to the many humanitarian and environmental crises we
presently face (Slovic, 2007). Here, we have demon-
strated that compassion fade emerges in the environmen-
tal domain, but only among those individuals who are
less engaged with problems facing the environment. The
present work highlights the critical need for further re-
search into this disturbing yet potentially solvable barrier
to greater compassion towards victims of circumstance
and provides researchers in the field with a previously
unstudied construct to explore. As we develop a better
understanding of the underlying mechanisms that pro-
mote the emergence of compassion fade, our ability to
effectively confront the phenomenon is similarly likely
to grow.
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